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NEW RULES FOR OPEN COURTS: PROGRESS
OR EMPTY PROMISE?
I. INTRODUCTION
In a system of government whose constitution guarantees both a
right to a free press' and the right to a fair trial by an impartial jury,2
conflicts between the two must be the inevitable and continuing result
if both rights are vigorously exercised. Perhaps in no area have those
two rights clashed more persistently than over the issue of allowing the
press to use mechanical or electronic equipment in the courtroom to
gather and disseminate news. Following a 1981 United States Supreme
Court decision which opened the door to the search for an equitable
resolution of this conflict,3 the Oklahoma Supreme Court made perma-
nent revised Canon 3A(7) of the Code of Judicial Conduct4 after a
three-year experiment with those rules.' Rejecting the prohibition
found in former Canon 3A(7), 6 the revised Canon permits "broadcast-
ing, televising, recording and taking photographs in the courtroom dur-
ing sessions of the court, including recesses between sessions"7 subject
to certain conditions. In addition to a requirement that media person-
nel not distract participants or impair the dignity of the proceedings,'
the Canon also provides for the number and kinds of cameras, media
sharing of both video and audio recordings, and utilization of existing
light sources.9 Telerecording is also conditioned upon the permission
of the judge10 and the individual participants." While seeming to open
courtrooms to electronic media coverage, experience in the experimen-
tal period and in other states indicates that the change in rules will
effect little change in practice. This Recent Development will consider
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
3. Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560 (1981).
4. In re Revised Canon 3A(7) of Code of Judicial Conduct, 53 OKLA. B.J. 584 (1982). The
revised Canon is codified at OKLA. STAT. tit. 5, ch. 1, app. 4 (1981).
5. New Rule Change For Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 3A(7), 49 OKLA. B.J. 2150
(1978) (Oklahoma Supreme Court order).
6. OKLA. STAT. tit. 5, ch. 1, app. 4 (1978).
7. Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 3A(7), OKLA. STAT. tit. 5, ch. 1, app. 4 (1981).
8. Id. Canon 3A(7)(b).
9. Id. Canon 3A(7)(f).
10. Id. Canon 3A(7)(a).
11. Id. Canon 3A(7)(c), (e).
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Although the debate over the propriety of cameras in the court-
room had begun some years earlier,'2 the massive media coverage and
the "circus atmosphere" of the murder trial of Bruno Hauptman stimu-
lated the American Bar Association to actively enter the debate with
the adoption of Judicial Canon 35 in 1937.13 The Canon originally
read:
Proceedings in court should be conducted with fitting
dignity and decorum. The taking of photographs in the court
room, during sessions of the court or recesses between ses-
sions, and the broadcasting of court proceedings are calcu-
lated to detract from the essential dignity of the proceedings,
degrade the court and create misconceptions with respect
thereto in the mind of the public and should not be
permitted.' 4
In 1952, the ABA responded to the growing influence of television by
inserting a specific ban on that medium.'5 However, an addition to the
Canon allowed the televising and broadcasting of certain ceremonial
12. See generally People v. Munday, 280 Ill. 32, -, 117 N.E. 286, 300 (1917) (taking photo-
graphs of trial improper); Exparte Sturm, 152 Md. 114, 120, 136 A. 312, 315 (1927) (judge's order
prohibiting courtroom photography upheld); In re Seed, 140 Misc. 681, 684, 251 N.Y.S. 615, 618
(Erie County Sup. Ct. 1931) (court expanded judge's power to prohibit photography "in the vicin-
ity of the court").
13. See Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 596-97 (1965) (appendix to concurring opinion, summa-
rizing history of Judicial Canon 35).
14. 62 A.B.A. REP. 1134-35 (1937). Canon 35 was presented to the ABA House of Delegates
as one of a number of additions and amendments to the Canons of Professional and Judicial
Ethics and was adopted unanimously on a blanket motion with no individual discussion or read-
ing. C. CARTER, MEDIA IN THE COURTS 5 (1981). By 1938, the ABA was being criticized from
within as having acted too hastily in adopting Canon 35. Blashfield, The Case ofthe Controversial
Canon, 48 A.B.A. J. 429, 430 (1962).
15. Canon 35 was amended to read:
Proceedings in court should be conducted with fitting dignity and decorum. The taking
of photographs in the court room, during sessions of the court or recesses between ses-
sions, and the broadcasting or televising of court proceedings are calculated to detract
from the essential dignity of the proceedings, distract the witness in giving his testimony,
degrade the court, and create misconceptions with respect thereto in the mind of the
public and should not be permitted.
77 A.B.A. REP. 110 (1952) (emphasis in original). In 1963, the House of Delegates softened the
Canon by deleting the words "are calculated to" before the word "detract" and deleting the phrase
"degrade the court." 88 A.B.A. REP. 117-18 (1963).
2
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 18 [1982], Iss. 1, Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol18/iss1/5
NEW RULES .FOR OPEN COURTS
proceedings.16
Despite the ABA's overwhelming and consistent denouncements
of camera coverage of trials, several states recognized that the Canon
was "merely an ABA sanctioned statutory scheme and did not carry the
weight of law" and continued to permit cameras in courtrooms either
as a matter of practice or in isolated instances. 7 Apparently, the first
television court coverage in the United States took place in Oklahoma
City in December, 1953.8 Two years later, a Waco, Texas court per-
mitted television and newsreel camera coverage of a murder trial19 in
what appears to have been the first trial ever broadcast "live."2 Dur-
ing public hearings to consider revision of Canon 35 in 1956, Colorado
addressed the question of whether to allow cameras in courtrooms.2'
During the six days of public hearings, many of the two hundred exhib-
its offered were photographs taken during the hearing without the refe-
ree's awareness. 2 In his recommendation, the referee indicted Canon
35 for its basis in assumptions and conjecture, and stated that the evi-
dence and demonstrations he witnessed "proved conclusively that the
assumption of facts as stated in the canon is wholly without support in
reality."23
Two years later, the Oklahoma Criminal Court of Appeals echoed
Colorado's refutation of Canon 35 principles, stating, "Our experience
is that when properly supervised by the court, there is neither distur-
bance, distraction, nor lack of dignity or decorum."'24 In contradiction,
16. 77 A.B.A. REP. 110-11 (1952).
17. See C. CARTER, supra note 14, at 7, (citing F. White, Cameras in the Courtroom: A Survey
of the United States 3-4 (Aug. 14, 1978) (background paper for Cameras in the Courtroom Plenary
Session, Association for Education in Journalism, Seattle, Wash.); Whisenand, Cameras and
Courtrooms: Fair Trial-Free Press Standards, 52 FLA. B.J. 456, 457 & n.l1 (1978)); Lyles v.
State, 330 P.2d 734, 738 (Okla. Crim. App. 1958); Goldman & Larson, News Camera in the Court-
room During State v. Solorzan." End to the Estes Mandate?, 10 Sw. U.L. Rnv. 2001, 2014-20
(1978).
18. See Geis, A Lively Public Issue: Canon 35 in the Light of Recent Events, 43 A.B.A. J. 419,
420 (1957) (citing Pebbles, Television Makes Progress in Oklahoma Courts (1956) (unpublished
paper, Dept. Soc., U. Okla.); Fields, News While It's News: It Can Be Done With TV, BROAD-
CASTING-TELECASTING 76 (Dec. 19, 1955)) (Cameras were housed in an enclosed booth, sound
was recorded on a hidden microphone, and additional lighting was provided by photoflood bulbs.
The presiding judge could discontinue operation of the cameras at any point by pressing a
button.).
19. Note, The Role of the Electronic Media in the Criminal Justice System, 47 CIN. L. REv.
417, 419 (1978).
20. Geis, supra note 18, at 420; Blashfield, supra note 14, at 432.
21. See In re Hearings Concerning Canon 35 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, 296 P.2d 465
(Colo. 1956) (en banc).
22. Id. at 466, 468.
23. Id. at 468.
24. Lyles v. State, 330 P.2d 734, 742 (Okla. Crim. App. 1958). Supporting the use of televi-
1982]
3
Broyles: New Rules for Open Courts: Progress of Empty Promise
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1982
TULSA LAW JOUAAL [Vol. 18:147
a year later, the Oklahoma Supreme Court adopted a modified version
of ABA Canon 35 prohibiting electronic and photographic media cov-
erage of active trial proceedings.2 5 Nevertheless, two years later, the
criminal appellate court indicated that camera coverage was an issue
within the proper province of the trial judge's discretion.26 The confu-
sion in Oklahoma ended in 1974 when the state supreme court adopted
the ABA prohibition2 7 in its entirety.28
Acknowledging the departure of a majority of states, 29 the ABA on
August 11, 1982 withdrew its forty-five year opposition to the use of
television, still cameras, and tape recordings in courtrooms. By a vote
of 162 to 112, the House of Delegates voted at the annual meeting to
support "unobtrusive" courtroom telecoverage under the governance of
carefully prescribed rules."
B. Supreme Court Treatment of Television Coverage
The United States Supreme Court's first occasion to rule specifi-
cally on the issue of cameras in the courtroom came as a result of the
1962 swindling and embezzlement trial of Texas financier Billy Sol Es-
tes.3' The Texas rule left to the trial judge's sound discretion the ques-
sion as a means of educating the public, the court described Canon 35 as a "baseless boogey
constructed out of pure conjecture," and stated that "the presumption upon which Canon 35 has
been constructed is fabricated out of sheer implication and not hammered out on the anvil of
experience." Id.
25. Oklahoma Canons of Judicial Ethics, No. 35, OKLA. STAT. tit. 5, ch. 1, app. 4 (1971).
Improper publicizing of court proceedings.
Proceedings in court should be conducted with fitting dignity and decorum. The
broadcasting, televising, or the taking of photographs in the court room should be done
only during recesses of the court with the consent of and under the supervision of the
court, and at such time or times as may be authorized by the court.
The broadcasting, televising, or photographing of active court proceedings, serve to
detract from the essential dignity of the proceedings, distract the witnesses and attorneys
in the performance of their duties, create misconceptions with respect thereto in the mind
of the public, and for these reasons should not be permitted.
Id.
26. The court held that the guarantee of a public trial is fulfilled when the trial is held at a
place where the general public can attend and that exclusion of the electronic media is within the
proper province of the judge. Cody v. State, 361 P.2d 307, 318 (Okla. Crim. App. 1961).
27. When the Code of Judicial Conduct was adopted by the ABA in 1972, Canon 3A(7)
superseded Canon 35. 97 A.B.A. REP. 556 (1972).
28. See Oklahoma Canons of Judicial Ethics, No. 3A(7), OKLA. STAT. tit. 5, ch. 1, app. 4
(Supp. 1978).
29. See infra text accompanying note 75.
30. ABA Repeals Its 1937 Canon Against Cameras in the Courtroom, Wash. Post, Aug. 12,
1982, at A3, col. 1.
31. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965). Although the Court in 1952 had considered the
effects of massive publicity including television and still cameras in the courtroom, in affirming a
4
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tion of whether to allow the televising and photographing of court
proceedings.32 Although live broadcasting of the pretrial hearing had
created major disruptions,33 trial coverage was accomplished with little,
if any, intrusion into the judicial process.34
In a five to four opinion, the Supreme Court held that Estes had
been denied his sixth amendment right to a fair trial before an impar-
tial jury as applied to the states by the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment. In his concurring opinion in Estes, Chief Justice
Warren, joined by Justices Douglas and Goldberg, argued that the rec-
ord in Estes illustrated the "inherent prejudice of televised criminal
trials,"36 and advocated an absolute per se ban on the televising of
trials.3 7 However, the limited concurrence of Justice Harlan provided
the bare plurality necessary for the reversal of Estes' conviction. Jus-
tice Harlan expressly limited his consideration to the facts of Estes,38
finding that the defendant's due process rights had been violated.39
In a strong dissent, joined by Justices Black, Brennan, and White,
Justice Stewart admitted his personal bias that the introduction of tele-
rape and murder conviction the Court did not specifically address the issue of cameras in the
courtroom. Stoble v. California, 343 U.S. 181 (1952).
32. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. at 535.
33. According to the Court:
The videotapes of these hearings clearly illustrate that the picture presented was not one
of that judicial serenity and calm to which petitioner was entitled. [citations omitted]
Indeed, at least 12 cameramen were engaged in the courtroom throughout the hearing
taking motion and still pictures and televising the proceedings. Cables and wires were
snaked across the courtroom floor, three microphones were on the judge's bench and
others were beamed at the jury box and the counsel table. It is conceded that the activi-
ties of the television crews and news photographers led to considerable disruption of the
hearings.
Id. at 536.
34. Id. at 537. Television cameras were housed in an inconspicuous booth at the rear of the
courtroom. No flashbulbs or floodlights were used, and photographs were not allowed inside the
railing. Id. at 553 (Warren, C.J., concurring). "Live" broadcast with sound consisted solely of the
prosecution's opening and closing remarks and the return of the jury's verdict. All types of audio,
video, and photographic coverage of defense counsel were prohibited at the request of Estes. Id.
at 537. The jury was sequestered. Id. at 609 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
35. Id. at 552 (Warren, C.J., concurring).
36. Id.
37. Id. at 580.
38. Id. at 590 (Harlan, J., limited concurrence).
39. Justice Harlan wrote:
My conclusion is that there is no constitutional requirement that television be allowed in
the courtroom, and, at least as to a notorious criminal trial such as this one, the consider-
ations against allowing television in the courtroom so far outweigh the countervailing
factors advanced in its support as to require a holding that what was done in this case
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vision into the courtroom is "an extremely unwise policy" but added, "I
am unable to escalate this personal view into a per se constitutional
rule."' 40 Explicitly declining to base his decision on a first amendment
argument, Justice Stewart did note his concern for a possible infringe-
ment of first amendment rights.
4
'
Both Justices Stewart and White read the Court's action as placing
a flat ban on the use of cameras in courtrooms. 42 But Justice Brennan
wrote a short dissent specifically to call attention to Justice Harlan's
limitation, and to point out that Estes was "not a blanket constitutional
prohibition against the televising of state criminal trials.
' 43
Despite the disagreement of the Justices as to the extent of the
Estes holding, the practical effect of the ruling was a reaffirmation of
Canon 35 and an almost complete" ban on courtroom telecoverage.
However, several states began to reconsider and experiment with cam-
era coverage.45  A challenge to the Florida experimental scheme re-
sulted in the 1981 United States Supreme Court decision, Chandler v.
Florida,46 which upheld the right of state courts to experiment with
electronic courtroom coverage. On appeal to the United States
40. Id. at 601-02 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
41. Id. Justice Stewart cautioned, "[W]e move in an area touching the realm of free commu-
nication, and for that reason, if for no other, I would be wary of imposing anyperse rule which, in
the light of future technology, might serve to stifle or abridge true First Amendment rights." Id. at
604.
42. Id. at 615 (White, J., dissenting).
43. Id. at 617 (emphasis in original) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
44. See Hoyt, Courtroom Coverage: The Effects of Being Televised, 21 J. BROADCASTING 487
(1977). Colorado has deviated from the trend by allowing courtroom telecoverage consistently
since the decision announced in In re Hearings Concerning Canon 35. C. Carter, Chart listing
states allowing electronic coverage of court proceedings (National Center for State Courts release,
Aug. 1981) (copy on file with Tulsa Law Journal).
45. See C. CARTER, supra note 14, at 25-27; see generally id at 52-123 (state-by-state listing
of the histories, as well as current status, of courtroom coverage); Goldman & Larson, supra note
17 (analysis of Nevada's experimental program).
46. Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560 (1981). After a one-year experiment from which the
Chandler challenge arose, In re Post-Newsweek Stations, Fla., Inc., 347 So. 2d 402, 403 (Fla.
1977), the Florida Supreme Court made permanent an amendment to Canon 3A(7) which permit-
ted electronic media coverage of judicial proceedings. In re Post-Newsweek Stations, Fla., Inc.,
370 So. 2d 764, 781 (Fla. 1979). In adopting the amendment, the court relied on the opinions of
Justices Harlan and Clark in limiting the application of Ertes to its particular factual situation.
Id. at 772-73. However, the court rejected an argument that there is a constitutional right of the
broadcast media to electronic coverage of trials. Id. at 774. Instead the court based its decision on
its supervisory authority over the Florida state courts. In making permanent the standards under
which the experimental program had operated, the court reiterated that electronic coverage is
"subject also to the authority of the presiding judge at all times to control the conduct of proceed-
ings before him to ensure a fair trial to the litigants." Id. at 781. Asserting that "on balance there
is more to be gained than lost by permitting electronic media coverage of judicial proceedings,"
the court cited as its prime motivating consideration Florida's commitment to open government.
Id. at 780.
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Supreme Court,4 7 the defendants argued that the televising of criminal
trials is inherently a denial of due process 48 relying principally on the
plurality opinion in Estes. In upholding the Florida convictions, the
Supreme Court relied on Justice Harlan's limitation in Estes, conclud-
ing that Estes did not announce a constitutional rule barring electronic
coverage in all cases.49 The Court further refused to hand down such a
constitutional ban in Chandler.50 Finding merit in the Florida Court's
contention that it had authority to establish rules of conduct in its state
courts, the Supreme Court upheld the right of states to experiment.5'
III. FREE PRESS VS. FAIR TRIAL
Although the seemingly inevitable conflict between the first
amendment right to a free press and the sixth amendment right to a fair
trial has been acknowledged by the Supreme Court as being "almost as
old as the Republic," 52 the Court has been consistently reluctant to ele-
vate one above the other.53 Recognizing that a trial is a public event
and that what transpires in the courtroom is public property,54 the
Court has held that the press has no right to information about a trial
47. The Florida District Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions but certified the question
of the constitutionality of Canon 3A(7) to the Florida Supreme Court. Chandler v. State, 366 So.
2d 64, 71 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979). Holding that the challenge to Canon 3A(7) was moot by
reason of its decision in In re Post-Newsweek Stations, Fla., Inc., 370 So. 2d 764 (Fla. 1979), the
Florida Supreme Court denied review. Chandler v. State, 376 So. 2d 1157 (Fla. 1979).
48. 449 U.S. at 570. At the time of their arrest for burglary, Chandler and Granger were
Miami Beach policemen. The principal prosecution witness was an amateur radio operator who
happened to hear and record conversations of the defendants over their police walkie-talkie radios
during the course of the burglary. The defendants sought unsuccessfully to prevent electronic
coverage of the trial and to have the jury sequestered. However, the court did instruct the jury not
to read or watch anything about the case. Id. at 567. A television camera was in place only for
the novel testimony of the chief prosecution witness and for closing arguments. Less than three
minutes of the trial proceedings were broadcast. Id. at 568.
49. Id. at 571-73.
50. Id. at 574-75.
51. Id. at 582-83.
52. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 547 (1976) (involving the media's constitu-
tional challenge to a state trial judge's pre-trial gag order).
53. See, e.g., Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 260 (1941) ("For free speech and fair trials
are two of the most cherished policies of our civilization, and it would be a trying task to choose
between them."). The Court in Nebraska Press reasoned,
The authors of the Bill of Rights did not undertake to assign priorities as between First
and Sixth Amendment rights, ranking one as superior to the other . . . . But if the
authors of these guarantees, fully aware of the potential conflicts between them, were
unwilling or unable to resolve the issues by assigning to one priority over the other, it is
not for us to rewrite the Constitution by undertaking what they declined to do.
427 U.S. at 561.
54. Craig v. Hamey, 331 U.S. 367 (1947).
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superior to that of the general public" and that the rights of the press
are relative, to be exercised freely only so long as they do not infringe
upon or injure the rights of others.56 The press has occasionally argued
that the sixth amendment right to a "speedy and public trial"57 guaran-
tees them a right of access to trials.58 But the Court has rejected this
argument, holding that the right to a public trial is a right of the ac-
cused, not of the public.5 9
Opponents of television coverage of judicial proceedings argue
that the admission of electronic media coverage jeopardizes the defend-
ant's right of confrontation and cross-examination as well as the de-
fendant's sixth amendment right to have his case heard by an impartial
jury.60 The plurality in Estes, finding televising of trial as per se denial
of defendants' due process rights, seems to have been most concerned
with problems of physical disturbance of the proceedings, psychologi-
cal impact on trial participants, and possibilities for prejudice.6' How-
55. In holding that broadcasters had no constitutional right to copy White House tapes
played during a Watergate conspiracy trial, the Court cited Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in
Estes as authority that a reporter's constitutional rights are no greater than those of the public.
Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 609 (1977).
56. Lyles v. State, 330 P.2d 734, 739 (Okla. Crim. App. 1958).
57. The sixth amendment provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be in-
formed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have
the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI.
58. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. at 562; see also Nixon v. Warner Com-
munications, Inc., 435 U.S. at 597-98 (discussion of common law right of access to judicial
records).
59. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 588 (1965). See also In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948). The
Court described the right to a public trial as an institutional safeguard:
Whatever other benefits the guarantee to an accused that his trial be conducted in public
may confer upon our society, the guarantee has always been recognized as a safeguard
against any attempt to employ our courts as instruments of persecution. The knowledge
that every criminal trial is subject to contemporaneous review in the forum of public
opinion is an effective restraint on possible abuse of judicial power.
Id. at 270.
60. A detailed discussion of the relative merits and potential problems of courtroom coverage
is beyond the scope of this Recent Development. For valuable discussions of the pro and con
arguments, see Blashfield, supra note 14; Whisenand, supra note 17; Goldman & Larson, supra
note 17; Geis, supra note 18; Note, supra note 19; Beaver, supra note 58; Note, supra, note 58;
Nevas, The Casefor Cameras in the Courtroom, 20 JUoGs J. 22 (1981); Tongue & Lintott, The
Case Against Television in the Courtroom, 16 WILLIAMETrE L.J. 777 (1980); Wilson, Justice in
Living Color: The Casefor Courtroom Television, 60 A.B.A. J. 294 (1974); Day, The Case against
Cameras in the Courtroom, 20 JUDGES J. 18 (1981).
61. 381 U.S. at 533 (syllabus by the Court). The plurality opinion stated,
(f) There are numerous respects in which televising court proceedings may alone, and
in combination almost certainly will, cause unfairness, such as: (1) improperly influen-
8
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ever, the Florida Supreme Court, after considering results of surveys of
judges and non-judicial participants, 62 determined that there is no logi-
cal basis to distinguish between the print and electronic media; the con-
cept of a public trial is promoted by electronic media coverage; there is
educational value in telecoverage; judicially controlled in-courtroom
electronic coverage is less likely to interfere with a fair trial than
"courthouse-lawn" electronic summary coverage; and that the public
confidence in the judiciary will be enhanced by electronic media cover-
age. The court also concluded that the pilot program had proven that
electronic media technology had evolved to a level at which the
telecoverage could be accomplished with no disturbance of judicial
proceedings.63
IV. EMPIRICAL DATA
Both the Estes Court in 19656 and the Chandler Court in 198165
pointed out the dearth of empirical data on the effects of telecasting on
trial participants. As predicted by Justice Stewart,66 the effect of Estes
was to discourage further meaningful study.67  The information that
has been gathered has come mostly in the form of case studies ranging
from opinion surveys of local bar associations68 to judicial assessment
of the success of a particular televised trial.69 Although helpful indicia
cing jurors by emphasizing the notoriety of the trial and affecting their impartial judg-
ment, distracting their attention, facilitating (in States which do not sequester jurors)
their viewing of selected parts of the proceedings, and improperly influencing potential
jurors and thus jeopardizing the fairness of new trials; (2) impairing the testimony of
witnesses, as by causing some to be frightened and others to overstate their testimony,
and generally influencing the testimony of witnesses, thus frustrating invocation of the
"rule" against witnesses; (3) distracting judges generally and exercising an adverse psy-
chological effect particularly upon those who are elected; and (4) imposing pressures
upon the defendant and intruding into the confidential attorney-client relationship.
62. Summaries of the results of both surveys are reported at In re Post-Newsweek Stations,
Fla., Inc., 370 So. 2d 764, 769 (Fla. 1979).
63. Id. (Of the judges responding to the survey who had experience with electronic media
coverage in the pilot program, 36 indicated positive reaction, 29 negative reaction, and 37
neutral.).
64. 381 U.S. at 552.
65. 449 U.S. at 576 n.ll.
66. Justice Stewart believed that,
The opinion of the Court in effect precludes further opportunity for intelligent assess-
ment of the probable hazards imposed by the use of cameras at criminal trials. ...
[A]lthough our experience is inadequate and our judgment correspondingly infirm, the
Court discourages further meaningful study of the use of television at criminal trials.
381 U.S. at 616 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
67. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
68. See, e.g., Geis, supra note 18, at 421.
69. See generally Goldman & Larson, supra note 17 (judicial critique of Nevada experimen-
tal program).
9
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of the effects of television on trial participants, case studies cannot be
generalized and are local in nature. 70 The state-wide studies conducted
in Florida and Wisconsin may be more readily generalized and repli-
cated than strict case studies, but they also contain flaws.7' Currently,
only one study appears in the available literature which has conformed
to standardized, empirical methodology capable of replication.72 The
study was not conducted in conjunction with an actual trial, since trials
are incapable of being repeated under controlled circumstances and are
less capable of generalization. Instead it simulated pressures placed on
witnesses in a courtroom setting. This format enabled the tester to
maintain experimental controls.73 The results of the study showed that
where there was knowledge of filming but the camera was not obtru-
sive, its presence had no significant effect on participants' responses.
Where the camera was obtrusive, participants responded to questions
more quickly and talked longer, but their answers also contained "sig-
nificantly more correct information directly relevant to the
questions."'74
Currently, sixteen states are experimenting by allowing at least
some electronic coverage, and fourteen states now permanently allow
television cameras in courtrooms. 75 Now that the door to experimenta-
tion has been opened, it is imperative that teachers and students of law,
journalism, and the behavioral sciences work with the courts in exam-
.ing the effects of television on trial participants through empirical
methods of study.
V. CONSENT REQUIREMENTS
In formulating a rule allowing television coverage, Oklahoma fol-
70. "[A]ll these case studies suffer from lack of generalizability inherent in case study meth-
odology. Simply because one trial can be conducted fairly under the camera's scrutiny does not
mean that others can." Netteburg, The resultsfrom studies conducted so far, 63 JUDICATURE 470,
471 (1980).
71. Because these studies were based upon samples of participants (Florida) and trials (Wis-
consin) rather than one specific trial, they are more readily generalized than a case study. How-
ever, they contain methodological flaws, such as extreme simplicity in instrumentation.
Netteburg, supra note 70, at 472-73. See A Sample Survey ofthe Attitudes of Individuals Associated
with Trials Involving Electronic Media and Still Photography Coverage in Selected Florida Courts
between July 5, 1977 andJune 30, 1978 (available from the Florida Supreme Court); Report ofthe
Supreme Court Committee to Monitor and Evaluate the Use of Audio and Visual Equfpment in the
Courtroom (Apr. 1, 1979) (available from the Wisconsin Supreme Court).
72. See Hoyt, supra note 44.
73. Id. at 490.
74. Id. at 494 (emphasis in original).
75, C. Carter, supra note 44.
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lowed the majority of states by requiring consent of the individual par-
ties.76 Consent rules reflect the uncertainty of the states in allowing
electronic coverage. While established as a compromise, consent re-
quirements have the effect of turning media access rules into empty
promises.7 Consent rules also remove some of the judge's authority to
control the proceedings of his court and make distortion of coverage
inevitable.78 In states that have consent rules, the judge may exclude
the media at his discretion, but he can only allow the media at the
discretion of himself and any number of other participants such as par-
ties, jurors, and witnesses. Since a trial is often an emotion-packed pro-
ceeding, these important decisions should properly be left to the sound
discretion of the trial judge, who is in the best position to balance and
safeguard the rights of all parties-the individual participants, broad-
casters, the press, and the public. 79
In contrast to consent rule states, Florida has wisely adopted a pre-
sumption of openness. Participants who object to being telecast are af-
forded a pre-trial opportunity to move for exclusion, and the presiding
judge is required to hear evidence on the motion." A defendant's due
process rights are further protected by his ability on review to show that
media coverage prejudiced the jury."1 The Wisconsin courts adopted a
permanent rule with no consent requirements, but which provides that
in certain instances, a request not to be photographed or recorded car-
ries a presumption of validity.82 In these cases, the burden of proof
moves to the media. If the media disagree with the ruling, they have
the difficult task of proving that the reason given by the victim was not
valid.83 Wisconsin also prohibits photographing of individual jurors
without specific and individual consent.8" The recurring theme in these
states' rules is that media access is subject to the sound discretion of the
76. See Hoyt, Prohibiting courtroom photography: it's up to the judge in Florida and Wiscon-
sin, 63 JUDICATURE 290, 292 (1980).
77. Nevas, supra note 60, at 49.
78. Id. at 50; Hoyt, supra note 76, at 292.
79. Lyles v. State, 330 P.2d 734, 745 (Okla. Crim. App. 1958).
80. In re Post-Newsweek Stations, Fla., Inc., 370 So. 2d 764, 778-79 (Fla. 1979).
81. Chandler v. Florida, 560 U.S. at 581.
82. As a result of compromises with special interest groups, the classes of individuals whose
requests to be excluded from electronic coverage are presumed valid include victims of sex crimes,
police informants, undercover agents, relocated witnesses, and juveniles. Types of proceedings to
which the presumption of validity applies include evidentiary hearings, divorce proceedings, and
cases involving trade secrets. Hoyt, supra note 76, at 294-95.
83. Id. at 295.
84. WISCONSIN COURT RULES AND PROCEDURES SCR 61.11(2) (West Supp. 1980). See C.
Carter, supra note 44, at 3.
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Today, television is the nation's primary means of news communi-
cation.8 6 As one commentator has observed, "[I]t's doing just fine"
without courtroom coverage.8 7 However, television, if properly super-
vised, has much to offer the judicial system, especially in terms of legiti-
mizing the system by acquainting people with it. Realistically, the vast
majority of the populace will be prohibited by time and other consider-
ations from ever observing courtroom proceedings first-hand. 8 If these
people are to glimpse the workings of this branch of government, it will
be by means of the electronic media. In this sense, the media can oper-
ate as a surrogate for the public89 and should be afforded as great a
degree of access to courtrooms as is consistent with the rights of the
defendant. While Oklahoma's adoption of revised Canon 3A(7) is a
step toward judicial openness, the rules should continue to be scruti-
nized and, as experience shows the value of courtroom telecoverage,
Canon 3A(7) should again be revised to eliminate consent
requirements.
Dona Kelly Broyles
85. See generally C. CARTER, supra note 14 (summary of state court rules).
86. A. ROPER, PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF TELEVISION AND OTHER MASS MEDIA (1979).
87. Wilson, supra note 60, at 294.
88. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491-92 (1975).
89. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980). "Instead of acquiring
information about trials by firsthand observation or by word of mouth from those who attended,
people now acquire it chiefly through the print and electronic media. In a sense, this validates the
media claim of functioning as surrogates for the public." Id. at 572-73.
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